

An Approach to Discover and Assess Vulnerability Severity Automatically in Cyber-Physical Systems

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Challenges in Vulnerability Assessment:

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(a) Subjective and Manual Audits.

(b) Diverse reporting sources with inconsistent scores.



Challenges in Vulnerability Assessment:

(a) Subjective and Manual Audits

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Expert Auditor 

Base Score

Select values for all base metrics to generate score

Attack Path (AP)

Network (N) Adjacent (A) Local (L) Physical (P)

Attack Complexity (AC)

Low (L) High (H)

Privileges Required (PR)

None (N) Low (L) High (H)

User Interaction (UI)

None (N) Required (R)

Scope (S)

Unchanged (U) Changed (C)

Confidentiality (C)

None (N) Low (L) High (H)

Integrity (I)

None (N) Low (L) High (H)

Availability (A)

None (N) Low (L) High (H)




(Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) V3 Calculator: <https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0>)



Challenges in Vulnerability Assessment:

(b) Diverse reporting sources with inconsistent scores



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Motivation: To Discover and Assess Vulnerability Severity Automatically

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
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- ▶ To enhance compatibility across different CVSS versions, while streamlining vulnerability analysis;
- ▶ To consolidate scores in a way that better describe the actual severity of vulnerability instance;
- ▶ To explore patterns of cyber-physical system (CPS) vulnerabilities.



Vulnerability Characteristics


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Adapted from CVSS Version 3 (<https://www.first.org/cvss/>)



Vulnerability Characteristics – Exploitability




Adapted from CVSS Version 3 (<https://www.first.org/cvss/>)

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Vulnerability Characteristics – Attack Path


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Adapted from CVSS Version 3 (<https://www.first.org/cvss/>)




Vulnerability Characteristics – Scope



Adapted from CVSS Version 3 (<https://www.first.org/cvss/>)

Vulnerability Characteristics – Impact



Adapted from CVSS Version 3 (<https://www.first.org/cvss/>)

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Existing Works

- ▶ Vulnerability severity analysis using CVSS mechanism.
 - Compatibility issues among existing CVSS versions was overlooked.
- ▶ Correlation studies between multiple cybersecurity data-sources.
 - Correlation studies considering different terminology used in cybersecurity and CPS domains are limited.
- ▶ Artificial-Intelligence Approaches for Cybersecurity:
 - Directly adopted CVSS scores from NVD as training ground.

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
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Discovering Vulnerability Severity

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


Vulnerability Severity Computing Pipeline



Majority Voting for Inconsistent Scores

- ▶ =2 inconsistent scores → Average of inconsistent scores
- ▶ >2 inconsistent scores → Majority voting of inconsistent scores



Vulnerability Severity Computing

Algorithm 1 Automatic Vulnerability Severity Computing

```
1: procedure SEVERITYCOMPUTING( $\mathcal{ML}, D, m, K$ )  
  ▶  $\mathcal{ML}$  is a machine learning model  $f()$ ,  $m$  is a set of CVSS  
  metrics  $m_j$  ( $0 < j \leq M$ ) where each metric  $m_j$  has a set of  $K^{m_j}$   
  classes, and  $D$  is a dataset with  $n$  vulnerability instance where  
  each instance  $(x_i, Y_i)$  ( $0 < i \leq N$ ) has a vulnerability report  $x_i$   
  and a ground truth vector  $Y_i$ .  
2:    $N = |D|, M = |m|$   
3:   for  $j = 1, \dots, M$  do  
4:     Train( $ML_j$ )  
5:      $f(x)^j = \arg \max_{K^{m_j}} f_{K^{m_j}}(x)^j$   
6:   end for  
7:   for  $i = 1, \dots, N$  do  
8:     for  $j = 1, \dots, M$  do  
9:        $Z_i^{(m_j)} = f(x_i)^j$   
10:    end for  
11:     $Z_i = [Z_i^{(m_1)}, \dots, Z_i^{(m_j)}, \dots, Z_i^{(m_M)}]$   
12:  end for  
13:  Severity Score  $S_i = CVSSCALCULATION(Z_i)$   
14: end procedure
```


- ▶ Allows customisation on selecting a preferable CVSS version.

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Evaluation Metrics of Text Mining

► Imbalanced classes of CVSS categorisations:



► Selected evaluation metrics: Balanced Accuracy & Micro F1-Score.



Evaluation Metrics of Text Mining

- ▶ Binary-class classification: apply the confusion matrix.
 - CVSS V3 AttackComplexity: Low; High.
 - CVSS V3 UserInteraction: None; Required.
- ▶ Multi-class classification: use micro-average to calculate the average of per class evaluation.
 - CVSS V3 PrivilegesRequired: None; Low; High.
 - CVSS V3 IntegrityImpact: None; Low; High.

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Dataset of LR-Based Algorithm are retrieved till Oct 27th 2020

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- ▶ Download Vulnerability score reports from NVD (2002–2019)
 - CVSS V2 (127 907 items)
 - CVSS V3 (58 813 items)
 - ▶ Crawl ICS CERT vulnerability analysis
 - ▶ Crawl Manufacturing vulnerability analysis
- 



Results of LR-Based Algorithm


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CVSS-Metric	Balanced Accuracy	Micro F1-Score
V2 AccessVector(AV)	80.87%	95.76%
V2 AccessComplexity(AC)	63.68%	83.63%
V2 Authentication(Au)	56.34%	95.00%
V2 ConfidentialityImpact(C)	81.03%	82.98%
V2 IntegrityImpact(I)	82.40%	84.60%
V2 AvailabilityImpact(A)	80.12%	81.08%
V3 AttackVector(AV)	75.92%	93.68%
V3 AttackComplexity(AC)	78.78%	95.58%
V3 PrivilegesRequired(PR)	78.79%	90.71%
V3 UserInteraction(UI)	93.45%	94.13%
V3 Scope(S)	93.65%	97.48%
V3 ConfidentialityImpact(C)	88.36%	91.46%
V3 IntegrityImpact(I)	90.58%	92.02%
V3 AvailabilityImpact(A)	75.75%	93.01%



Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Vulnerability

► CPS vulnerability filter for vulnerable component.



► Filter for vendor information, combined with manual checking.

- Schneider Electric SE ('schneider-electric', 'chneider-electric', and 'schneider-electric', etc.,.)



Cyber-Physical System (CPS) Vulnerability

► Retrieved CPS vulnerability instances (till Oct 27th 2020).

CPS Asset	Number
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC)	89
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)	32
Master Terminal Unit (MTU)	8
Human Machine Interface (HMI)	105



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CPS Vendors Characteristics Using Top Keywords

- Schneider Electric SE (24 instances)

- Siemens AG (39 instances)



Characteristic Analysis for CPS Vulnerabilities

CPS on average

Metric	Measurement	PLC	RTU	MTU	HMI	CPS	CVE
AttackPath	Network	93.26%	100%	87.50%	84.76%	90.17%	74.35%
	AdjacentNetwork	0%	0%	0%	0.95%	0.43%	22.57%
	Local	5.62%	0%	12.50%	13.33%	8.55%	2.01%
	Physical	1.12%	0%	0%	0.95%	0.85%	1.06%
AttackComplexity	Low	97.75%	100%	100%	99.05%	98.72%	91.21%
	High	2.25%	0%	0%	0.95%	1.28%	8.79%
PrivilegesRequired	None	95.51%	78.13%	100%	92.38%	91.45%	69.55%
	Low	4.49%	12.50%	0%	7.62%	7.26%	25.18%
	High	0%	9.37%	0%	0%	1.28%	5.28%
UserInteraction	None	83.14%	100%	87.50%	67.62%	78.63%	62.80%
	Required	16.85%	0%	12.50%	32.38%	21.37%	37.20%
ScopeChange	Unchanged	92.13%	100%	100%	85.71%	90.60%	83.64%
	Changed	7.87%	0%	0%	14.29%	9.40%	16.36%

Overall in CVE

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Characteristic Analysis for CPS Vulnerabilities

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Metric	Measurement	PLC	RTU	MTU	HMI	CPS	CVE
ConfidentialityImpact	None	43.82%	21.87%	50.00%	17.14%	26.92%	22.15%
	Low	7.87%	0%	0%	10.48%	8.97%	19.10%
	High	48.31%	78.13%	15.00%	72.38%	64.10%	58.75%
IntegrityImpact	None	42.70%	46.88%	50.00%	39.05%	43.16%	31.14%
	Low	7.87%	0%	0%	10.48%	7.69%	17.20%
	High	49.45%	53.12%	50.00%	50.48%	49.15%	51.66%
AvailabilityImpact	None	13.48%	28.13%	37.50%	29.52%	22.65%	38.22%
	Low	0%	0%	0%	1.90%	0.85%	2.30%
	High	86.52%	71.87%	62.50%	68.57%	74.36%	61.19%


CPS on average

Overall in CVE



Characteristic Analysis for CPS Vulnerabilities

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CVSS Version3 Base-Scores Distribution of CPS Vulnerabilities (2002-2020)



Planned Works

- ▶ Optimising majority voting method.
 - Apply majority voting to the sub-metrics of CVSS.
 - Use the weighted arithmetic mean of different scores from several sources.
 - Adjust the tie of majority voting under experts' supervision.

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Thanks!